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ARTICLE
COURT OF APPEALS DYNAMICS IN
THE AFTERMATH OF A SUPREME
COURT RULING
STEPHEN L. WASBY *
INTRODUCTION
Examinations of the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court
and the U.S. courts of appeals usually look “down” at the impact of
*

B.A., Antioch College; M.A., Ph.D. (political science), University of Oregon. Professor
Emeritus of Political Science, University at Albany—SUNY. Residing in Eastham, Mass. Contact:
wasb@albany.edu.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Ninth Circuit Senior Judge Alfred T.
Goodwin for access to his papers and the case files on which this Article is based, as well as his
comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and to Virginia Hettinger, University of Connecticut, for
raising useful questions. An earlier version of this Article was presented to the American Political
Science Association, Washington, D.C., Sept. 5, 2010.
The author’s interest in the border-search cases goes back at least to the late 1970s, when
one of his students at Southern Illinois University—Carbondale, Michael Wepsiec (now States
Attorney for Jackson County, Illinois), conducted an honors study of cases involving the “founded
suspicion” necessary for a stop in border searches. The work is reported in Michael Wepsiec &
Stephen L. Wasby, Ninth Circuit Border Searches: Doctrines and Inconsistencies (2000)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
The reader should note that the author reviewed the Goodwin Papers while conducting
research for this Article; the unpublished documents cited here are available in the Goodwin Papers,
which are held at the Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon. The author has made every effort
to ensure the accuracy of citations to, and quotations from, those documents, but the author notes
that the editors of the Golden Gate University Law Review have not had the opportunity to review
the documents from the Goodwin Papers cited or referred to here.
Unpublished dispositions were read in slipsheet form—the only form in which they made
available during the period studied—at the Ninth Circuit headquarters courthouse in San Francisco.
Unless otherwise specified, all those named as senders or recipients of memoranda are or
were judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. “Associates” refers to all the judges
of the court.
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single Supreme Court decisions on subsequent lower court rulings; not
even the related cases the Justices dispatch with grant-vacate-remand
(GVR) orders are taken into account. The implicit assumption seems to
be that the relationship is both direct and simple, with later lower-court
rulings embodying the substance of the Supreme Court’s opinion.
Matters are, however, far from being quite so simple. A Supreme Court
ruling, particularly if not unanimous, may require interpretation. In
addition, more than one Supreme Court case may be simultaneously in
play, cases may also be moving between the two courts, and cases likely
will be at various stages in the appellate process at the time of the
Supreme Court’s primary ruling. This sets up a dynamic situation.
Studies of the effects of the U.S. Supreme Court on lower federal
courts usually focus on outcomes (affirm or reverse) and, to a lesser
extent, on whether lower courts’ opinions reflect or are out-of-sync with
the Supreme Court. The effect of the Supreme Court is regularly
understated because it misses several elements and particularly the lower
courts’ lower-visibility actions (or non-actions), which are no less
important despite their lower visibility. Included are the often-extensive
discussions within the courts of appeals as to the meaning of the
Supreme Court’s opinions, the pending cases that might have to be
revisited, and rehearing petitions that will have to be entertained based
on the new Supreme Court rulings. Also not much appreciated is courts
of appeals’ anticipatory deference to the Supreme Court, particularly the
deferring of action when the Justices are seen as likely soon to issue a
ruling affecting pending cases, either by having granted certiorari to a
case containing an issue before a court of appeals panel or even only
considering granting certiorari to such a case.
Whether Supreme Court rulings “make a difference” in the lower
courts, a question not substantially explored by scholars, thus remains an
open question. One reason is that we lack information about how a U.S.
court of appeals actually deals with its superior’s intervention into its
ongoing work and how it handles the fallout from Supreme Court action.
A law-changing Supreme Court ruling affects the immediate parties, but
it also affects many factually similar or legally related cases. When the
Supreme Court decision also potentially affects many cases then “in the
pipeline,” the affected lower court will have to engage in extra activity to
cope, perhaps recalling mandates in recently decided cases and altering
outcomes or remanding cases for further proceedings. These effects
expand as the Justices return other cases to the circuit for reconsideration
in light of the primary ruling or if they soon rule on related issues.
The Supreme Court ruling will also be incorporated into pending
cases in the court of appeals, which must engage in discussion of what
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the Supreme Court meant. The judges may withdraw submission in
cases already submitted for decision and call for supplemental briefing,
or they may instead remand rather than reach a merits disposition. From
among cases pending, the court may select one or more to serve as
vehicles for deciding multiple closely related questions. With many
three-judge panels dealing with similar issues, the court may choose to
sit en banc to maintain consistent results, and multiple en banc rulings
decided at, or nearly at, the same time may reference each other. And, in
the dynamic interaction that develops over time, cases that are both
before panels and the en banc court may be affected by, and be affected
by, Supreme Court rulings. Interaction between the court of appeals and
the Supreme Court is thus quite dynamic. An initial Supreme Court
opinion on a topic is unlikely to answer all questions. Thus the court of
appeals judges can anticipate that the Justices will accept cases on
follow-up questions, and those decisions will occur just as the appeals
court judges are attempting to assimilate the first ruling, which perhaps
may cause them to move hesitantly or even to suspend action until the
Justices have ruled. Processes such as these may proceed through
several iterations.
This Article provides an examination of such complex dynamic
interaction in the aftermath of the key 1973 border-search case of
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 1 In that aftermath, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where that case originated, had to cope
with a mix of fast-developing Fourth Amendment law and the uncertain
law of retroactivity as well as the effects in the many recently decided or
pending appeals stemming from searches of varying intrusiveness at or
near the border, at fixed checkpoints, whether permanent or temporary at
a given location, or by roving patrols. The resulting question of
retroactivity made the dynamics more complex: Was Almeida-Sanchez to
be applied to pending cases and, if so, to those where searches pre-dated
Almeida-Sanchez, to convictions on appeal when it was decided, or to
recently-decided rulings not yet final because rehearing was possible?
All this was made more difficult as several more Supreme Court rulings
came down while the court of appeals was trying to sort out matters.
What we see is, first, a story interesting in its own right for what it
has to say with respect to the development of the law of search and
seizure, and of border searches in particular, and also for contemporary
concerns about “control of the border.” However, we also see a picture
that may well be more generally indicative of the inter- and intra-court
1

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (warrantless search by roving
patrol away from border is not statutorily authorized border search and violates Fourth Amendment).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6

8

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

dynamics that transpire in areas of law with high volumes of cases that
are at various stages of the appellate process when the Supreme Court
hands down a major ruling announcing new rules of law.
This Article proceeds in chronological fashion but only roughly so;
a chronological baseline is provided to aid the reader, and analysis of
aspects of Supreme Court-court of appeals interaction is presented. The
Article is based not only on court opinions but also on case files in the
papers of Senior U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, which
contain communications among the judges as they decided cases; these
materials provide necessary gritty texture to the usual portrayals of
courts. Judge Goodwin’s papers are especially significant here because
he served as the court’s en banc coordinator, responsible for monitoring
and facilitating the judges’ communication. 2 While the full court
participated in the process of selecting cases for en banc treatment in the
Almeida-Sanchez “backwash,” 3 the en banc coordinator, working in
concert with the chief judge and his colleagues, played a particularly
important role. He did so not only by serving as the communication
node for the court’s judges but also by helping direct cases for en banc
consideration and even by selecting some of them.
In the description and analysis that follow, one will see—and should
be on the lookout for—a number of elements in the relationship between
the U.S. courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. It is certainly clear
that the Supreme Court has a great effect on later cases in the lower
appellate courts. Thus, upon the Supreme Court’s handing down a
relevant decision, a court of appeals will reconsider its own rulings on
the basis of that decision or will remand to the district courts so that they
may do so. While that might be considered obvious, there is also, as will
be seen in what follows, considerable evidence that judges of the U.S.
courts of appeals wait for the Supreme Court to act. Indeed, cases
decided after a major Supreme Court ruling may well have been held
until that ruling was issued. So, instead of plunging ahead, a court of
appeals may well hold back to await further developments once cases on
point have been tendered to the Justices for possible review, in what we
might call anticipatory deference. Likewise, we see that, within the
court of appeals, some panels may also defer action until “lead” cases on
a subject are decided, with cases selected for en banc hearing—even

2

For a more complete treatment of the work of the en banc coordinator, see Stephen L.
Wasby, “A Watchdog for the Good of the Order”: The Ninth Circuit’s En Banc Coordinator, 12 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91 (2011).
3
The term was used in a memorandum from Chief Judge Richard Chambers to Associates
(Jan. 28, 1975).
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before panel ruling—to assist all panels in their work. And we will see
as well another way in which the court of appeals defers to the Supreme
Court, when it facilitates the moving of cases to the high court, perhaps
by prompt en banc hearing of cases, which it may do even before panels
have completed their work.
THE BEGINNING: ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ AND ITS GVRS
Toward the end of its 1972 Term, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its ruling in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 4 (See
timeline at 46.) Justice Stewart, writing for a five-Justice majority,
reversed the Ninth Circuit, revoking the carte blanche of 8 U.S.C. §
1357, 5 and held that a warrantless search of an automobile by a roving
patrol at a point at least twenty miles from the border, without probable
cause or consent, was not a border search authorized by federal law. 6
Recognizing that “national self protection reasonably requir[es] one
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in,” the Justices
upheld the constitutionality of border searches at the physical border or
its functional equivalent. 7 While joining the majority opinion, Justice
Powell wrote separately to note that this case did not involve “the
constitutional propriety of searches at permanent or temporary
checkpoints removed from the border or its functional equivalent,” 8 thus
indicating matters with which the lower courts would have to deal. Not
only was Justice Powell’s opinion to be debated, but the date of the
Court’s decision—June 21, 1973—was to become central to much
subsequent Ninth Circuit activity.
Like all other border-search cases discussed here, the case had
originated in the Southern District of California. The panel majority,
Judges James Carter and Ozell Trask, had affirmed a conviction for
importing marijuana, in a four-paragraph per curiam opinion. 9 They
recognized that the search was not a “border search” but held that the

4

Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266.
The statute, inter alia, allows immigration officers, without a warrant, to interrogate and
arrest aliens and suspected aliens, and to search and board vessels. The relevant regulation spoke of
searches within 100 miles of the border. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (Westlaw 2011).
6
The actual stop was twenty-five miles north of the border. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at
268.
7
Id. at 272 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1924)).
8
Id. at 276 (Powell, J., concurring).
9
United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), rev’d, 413
U.S. 266 (1973).
5
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federal statute and regulation allowed it and found the search reasonable
in scope. In his extensive dissent, Judge James Browning recognized,
“Of course, prior decisions of other panels of this court bind this panel.”
However, he felt that those rulings were “so clearly at odds with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment that they should be overruled.” 10
It was Judge Browning’s position that Justice Stewart basically adopted.
In dealing with border searches before Almeida-Sanchez, the Ninth
Circuit had adopted some standards. One was “continuous surveillance,”
in which a search of a vehicle away from the border would be upheld if
the vehicle had been under continuous surveillance since it crossed the
border. Also adopted was the related test that a search would be valid if
the totality of circumstances persuaded the factfinder with a “reasonable
certainty” that the contraband seized had been on board the vehicle from
its crossing of the border. 11 However, the court had moved toward
approving checkpoint searches as if they were border searches, with
Judge Browning saying, “We simply upheld all alien searches within 100
miles of the border . . . . The fact that some of the searches may have
occurred at a checkpoint was irrelevant.” 12 As the Supreme Court, while
issuing some denials of certiorari, had not intervened in the Ninth
Circuit’s border-search work, one could be “safe in saying that Almeida
is the first time the Court has spoken since the 9th Circuit took it upon
itself to develop new law re border searches.” 13
As soon as the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez, two issues
were raised, and they were to pervade the subsequent cases. One was
whether fixed checkpoints were within Almeida-Sanchez’s ambit. It was
raised by one of the court’s more senior members, Judge Fred Hamley,
who quoted from the Supreme Court’s opinion and asserted that “the
Court included checkpoint searches as well as searches by roving
patrols.” 14 However, in a theme that recurred in Ninth Circuit discussion
over the next few years, he did note “observations” about the lead
opinion in Justice White’s dissent and Justice Powell’s concurring
opinion “to the effect that Almeida-Sanchez does not involve permanent
10

Id. at 461 (Browning, J., dissenting).
United States v. Alexander, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966); see Memorandum from
Barbara Reeves (law clerk to Judge Goodwin) (n.d.).
12
Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Sept. 1, 1973). This would to tend
to indicate that ideologically the court was relatively homogeneous on this matter. However, some
aspects of search law, such as what constituted “founded suspicion” for a search, did produce
disagreement within the court, particularly between its two most liberal members, Walter Ely and
Shirley Hufstedler, and their more conservative colleagues.
13
Memorandum from Barbara Reeves to Judge Goodwin (n.d.).
14
Memorandum from Fred Hamley to Judges Eugene Wright, Charles Powell (E.D. Wash.),
and Associates, (Aug. 1, 1973) (re United States v. Schlect, No. 72-2445).
11
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or temporary checkpoints.”15 The other issue was retroactivity. Within a
few weeks of the Supreme Court’s ruling, a judge wrote to the en banc
coordinator, Judge Goodwin, “I am not sure if it was ever decided what
case we are waiting for on the decision of retroactivity,” and noted that “I
have couple of cases waiting.” 16
The Supreme Court also returned two cases to the Ninth Circuit for
reconsideration in light of Almeida-Sanchez. In Foerster v. United
States, after certiorari had been granted in Almeida-Sanchez but a year
before the Supreme Court’s decision, a panel of Judges Browning,
Merrill, and Wright, speaking per curiam and citing the court’s own
Almeida-Sanchez ruling, had held that immigration officers may stop and
investigate cars for concealed aliens without probable cause. 17 After the
GVR, Judge Browning, who had “been assigned the writing of an
opinion . . . involving the question of Almeida-Sanchez’s applicability to
searches at ‘fixed checkpoints,’” thought the proper course was to
remand cases like Foerster (there were others as well) to the district
court “to determine whether a search at the relevant checkpoint was the
‘functional equivalent’ of a border search within the meaning of Justice
Stewart’s plurality opinion.” 18 His law clerk drafted an opinion, but,
showing the interrelationship between various cases in the court of
appeals, suggested it be filed only if Judge Goodwin were to hold
Almeida-Sanchez retroactive to appeals pending when that case was
decided. 19 Judge Browning, who proposed to wait for a Judge Goodwin
opinion “holding that the rule of Almeida-Sanchez is to be applied to
pending appeals,” 20 said he was “content to await Judge Goodwin’s
views on both issues.” 21
The other post-Almeida-Sanchez GVR was Bowen v. United
States, 22 the ruling for which Judge Browning would wait. At first this

15

Id. In a July 12, 1973, memorandum, Judge J. Clifford Wallace quoted Justice White’s
dissent and Justice Powell’s concurrence in support of his position that Almeida-Sanchez
encompassed no more than roving patrols. Judge Browning was to disagree, objecting on Sept. 1,
1973, to Judge Wallace’s calling Justice Stewart’s opinion “the plurality opinion” when, for
Browning, it was “the opinion of the Court.”
16
Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 12, 1973).
17
Foerster v. United States, 455 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1972), reh’g denied Mar. 15, 1972, cert.
granted, vacated, remanded, 413 U.S. 915 (1973).
18
Memorandum from James R. Browning to Alfred T. Goodwin, Charles Merrill (Aug. 31,
1973).
19
Memorandum from Jim Babcock (law clerk to Judge Browning) to Browning (Aug. 28,
1973).
20
Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Aug. 15, 1973).
21
Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Sept. 1, 1973).
22
United States v. Bowen, 462 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. granted, vacated,

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6

12

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

case seemed relatively insignificant, but it was to become one of the
Ninth Circuit’s first en banc rulings on border searches and the court’s
focal case in Almeida-Sanchez’s immediate aftermath, and it would also
return to the Supreme Court. Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
Almeida-Sanchez but before Supreme Court arguments, a panel of
Circuit Judges Charles Merrill and Alfred Goodwin and District Judge
Lawrence Lydick (C.D. Cal.) had, per curiam, affirmed a conviction for
smuggling marijuana and other drugs on the basis that the evidence was
sufficient to uphold the convictions. 23 The panel’s one sentence about
the search (“The search and seizure were plainly lawful.” 24 ) was in effect
a holding that stops by an immigration officer at a fixed checkpoint
station were valid under § 1357.25
A third Supreme Court GVR in light of Almeida-Sanchez,
Chambers v. United States, came at the beginning of the Supreme
Court’s next Term. 26 It had been an unpublished affirmance of a
conviction also from the Southern District of California in which the
challenged search had taken place in 1972. 27 In an indication that the
complex development of border search and retroactivity law could delay
final action in cases, after the Supreme Court’s remand the Ninth Circuit
panel of (former) Chief Judge Chambers, Judge Herbert Choy, and
District Judge William Sweigert (N.D. Cal.) took until April 5, 1977, to
dispose of the case by affirming the district court because AlmeidaSanchez “does not retroactively apply to fixed checkpoint searches which
occurred prior to the date that case was decided.” 28
EN BANCS
The Supreme Court’s Bowen remand began a period of considerable
Ninth Circuit en banc activity, with several en banc cases proceeding in
parallel. Activity in Bowen is a thread tying together the Ninth Circuit’s
post-Almeida-Sanchez border-search cases. At one point, a judge noted
that the court had taken seven cases en banc to deal with various
elements posed by the Almeida-Sanchez “problem.” 29 This is what

remanded, 413 U.S. 915 (1973).
23
Bowen, 462 F.2d 347.
24
Id. at 348.
25
Id.
26
Chambers v. United States, 414 U.S. 896 (1973) (granting cert., vacating, and remanding).
27
United States v. Chambers, No. 73-1028.
28
United States v. Chambers, 554 F.2d 1071 (1977).
29
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Feb. 25, 1974) (re United States v.
Bowen, No. 72-1012).
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Judge Goodwin, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc coordinator, called a
“dreadful glut” of such cases. 30 The en banc coordinator had the duty of
enforcing court rules, particularly deadlines for circulation of memos
about en banc rehearing, and of superintending the voting on whether to
rehear a case en banc. 31 As Chief Judge Richard Chambers had asked
Judge Goodwin to take the position not long after Goodwin joined the
court in 1971, during decision of the border-search cases he was “a
rookie en banc coordinator.” 32 During this period, the Ninth Circuit en
banc was the full court, not the more limited en banc panel (LEB) used
starting in 1980, so all the judges were involved in all border-search
cases that were proceeding simultaneously during this period of intense
activity.
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit received news that the Supreme
Court had GVR’d Bowen, Judge Goodwin noted that the case had
already been discussed at a meeting of court and council 33 and indicated
the need for a comprehensive opinion in the case. His position: “I cannot
conceive of any basis for refusing to apply Almeida-Sanchez to cases
pending on appeal at the time the Supreme Court issued its opinion.” 34
He pointed to “[t]he manner in which the Supreme Court summarily
vacated Bowen and remanded it for consideration in light of AlmeidaSanchez,” which he said “would seem to answer the question whether
Almeida-Sanchez was intended to apply to pending cases.” 35 As he put
it, “The Supreme Court evidently thinks Almeida-Sanchez applies to
cases that had been decided in our court, and, a fortiori, would apply to
cases still on appeal in our court.” 36 Not only did his law clerk disagree
with him on this point, 37 but Chief Judge Chambers also took a poke,
taking a dim view of court-wide memoranda on the meaning of “The
judgment is vacated and remanded for consideration in the light

30

Email from Alfred T. Goodwin to author (Apr. 15, 2010) (on file with author).
See Stephen L. Wasby, “A Watchdog for the Good of the Order”: The Ninth Circuit’s En
Banc Coordinator, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91 (2011).
32
Email from Alfred T. Goodwin to author (Apr. 15, 2010) (on file with author).
33
At that time, the circuit council consisted of the court’s active judges sitting while wearing
their administrative hats. District judges were to be added to the circuit council in 1980.
34
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Judge Wallace, Judge William Byrne (C.D.
Cal.), and Associates (July 16, 1973).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Memorandum from Don Friedman (law clerk to Judge Goodwin) to Judge Goodwin (Aug.
6. 1973) (“I don’t think that we can draw any inference about how the Court felt that AlmeidaSanchez was to be applied. To my mind, all that the Court was doing was remanding . . . to consider
whether or not Almeida-Sanchez was to be given retroactive effect.”).
31
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of . . . .” 38 Even before the Supreme Court’s GVR order was received,
the panel agreed that Judge Goodwin would get the case when the
mandate came down, and this case assignment became effective on
August 2, 1973.
Discussion quickly took place as to whether to take cases en banc
and which cases to hear en banc that would present an issue cleanly.
Some ideological differences were reflected in approaches put forth, but
the focus was on the need to set forth clear statements of the law, and this
diminished the role of judges’ ideological propensities. Judge J. Clifford
Wallace disagreed with Judges Fred Hamley and James Browning on the
need to remand cases to determine if a checkpoint was the functional
equivalent of the border. He also noted that there was intra-circuit
disagreement, particularly that Judge Browning’s proposed approach in
Foerster was at odds with the approach to be taken in several cases in
which Judge Wallace was in the majority. 39 Judge Ben Duniway
“supposed that this is the kind of situation in which we ought to go in
banc, since there seems to be a pretty sharp disagreement as to the effect
of Almeida-Sanchez on searches at fixed checkpoints and at temporary
checkpoints.” 40 However, he now felt that a panel should rule “one way
or the other and . . . then we should all follow the decision whether we
agree with it or not.” If the Supreme Court “doesn’t like our solution it
can change it,” he said. 41 Ten days later, Judge Duniway agreed that if
the court “can get one lead case on both the retroactivity issue and the
checkpoint issue, it will save us a lot of trouble.” 42 Still later, in the
context of the retroactivity of fixed checkpoint searches, he was again to
propose that all other panels hold their cases for decision until one lead
case was decided, which other panels would follow. 43 His view was
echoed by Chief Judge Chambers: “My notion has been to ask someone
to go ahead as the lead panel and the rest of us to stay our hands.” 44
Earlier, Chambers had said he couldn’t “imagine . . . proposing en banc”
but shortly afterward he said that, in the border-search cases before him,

38

Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 18, 1973). He said,
“[A]s I see it you are free to consider retroactivity in Bowen and I think it should be resolved on the
basis of whether Almeida-Sanchez more nearly fits the cases where the Supreme Court has
theretofore given retroactivity or made such a ruling prospective.”
39
Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to Associates and senior judges (Aug. 27, 1973).
40
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Aug. 31, 1973). “In banc” was Judge
Duniway’s preferred spelling.
41
Id.
42
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Sept. 10, 1973).
43
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (July 21, 1975).
44
Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (July 28, 1975).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss1/6

10

Wasby: Inter-Court Dynamics

2011]

Inter-Court Dynamics

15

he would follow the Bowen panel without taking the case en banc. 45
This foreshadowed his dissent from the court’s action granting en banc
hearing. 46
As this discussion within the court continued, judges increasingly
commented on the fact that many border-search cases were in a state of
suspension because of undecided Almeida-Sanchez issues. At first,
individual cases were noted and others in a “holding pattern” 47 were
continually added to the list. When, as en banc coordinator, Judge
Goodwin wrote to his colleagues about four cases relating to the
“functional equivalent” (of the border), Judge Hamley added one and
noted yet another in an Addendum, and Judge Joseph Sneed followed the
next day with mention of two more, 48 one of which, Brignoni-Ponce,
was to become both an en banc and a Supreme Court case. 49 Then a list
created by one of Judge Browning’s law clerks 50 led Judge Goodwin’s
chambers also to list all the twenty-four cases, suggested by various
judges, with an indication of their status such as whether they had been
remanded to the district court. Other members of the court continued
over the next weeks to suggest cases with which they were familiar. 51
Some of the cases were already known, at least to Judge Goodwin, but
Judge Trask suggested the Grijalva-Carrera case, 52 which later became
an en banc decision, 53 and Judge Duniway threw several into the hopper,

45

Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Alfred T. Goodwin (July 18, 1973);
memorandum from Richard Chambers to Shirley Hufstedler, Associates (July 23, 1973). Chief
Judge Chambers was generally opposed to en banc rehearing, a view not all judges shared. He felt
that if a case was sufficiently important, the Supreme Court would take it and that en banc hearing
would delay getting that case to the Supreme Court.
46
United States v. Bowen, 485 F.2d 1388, 1388 (9th Cir. 1973) (Chambers, C.J., dissenting
from grant of rehearing en banc).
47
The term was used in a memorandum from Judge J. Clifford Wallace to Alfred T.
Goodwin (Oct. 11, 1973), and in a memorandum from Judge Goodwin to all active judges, others
(Dec. 14, 1973).
48
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Sept. 10, 1973); memorandum from
Fred Hamley to Associates (Sept. 13, 1973); memorandum from Joseph Sneed to Associates (Sept.
14, 1973).
49
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), aff’d, 422 U.S.
873 (1975).
50
Memorandum from David Raish (law clerk to Judge Browning) to James T. Browning
(Sept. 14, 1973). In an intriguing bit of research, Raish obtained information of the location of
checkpoints, by telephone, from the regional counsel of the INS.
51
See, for example, a list of six submitted by Judge Wallace. Memorandum from J. Clifford
Wallace to Alfred T. Goodwin (Oct. 1, 1973).
52
Memorandum from Ozell Trask to Alfred T. Goodwin, Richard Chambers (Oct. 12, 1973).
53
United States v. Grijalva-Carrera, 500 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam).
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along with comments as to their status, in light of the need for checkpoint
cases. 54
Judge Duniway presented another list of cases in connection with
the question of the retroactivity of the court’s own Bowen ruling, 55 and
Chief Judge Chambers both reported a “group of 21 cases in the slipstream of Almeida-Sanchez that panels of the court have been holding”
and also said, “We must have about 40 cases in the backwash of the . . .
Supreme Court decisions.” 56 He again touched on the volume of
affected cases in a subsequent remark that “altogether we will have 50
petitions for rehearing on retroactivity.” 57 Judge Shirley Hufstedler
supplied another list, this time on the question of the retroactivity of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Ortiz case, 58 and Judge Duniway added
still more. 59 The lists shifted somewhat as some issues were resolved
and new cases came into the picture, but as almost all cases were from
the Southern District of California, they thus came from a small number
of district judges, making basically irrelevant which district judge had
decided a case.
Throughout this process, the judges’ concern was not merely one of
accounting for cases but of taking consistent actions. Thus, after the
Bowen en banc ruling, when the government filed “a boiler-plate request
for an open-ended stay of the mandate while the Solicitor General picks a
case for certiorari,” the en banc coordinator suggested that “[i]n the
interest of uniformity,” all affected panels allow stays of only thirty days
“or a stay of the mandate until some day certain.” 60 Judge Duniway
suggested that “we have ought to have a uniform policy” in reacting to
government requests for extensions of time to file, 61 and the judges
agreed to have Chief Judge Chambers issue an appropriate order.
When Judge Goodwin continued discussing which cases should be
taken en banc, he reported “two problems in Bowen: retroactivity and
checkpoint search,” while another possible en banc case, Gordon, had
only retroactivity. 62 After Goodwin circulated a proposed panel opinion

54

Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Oct. 16, 1973).
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (July 21, 1975).
56
Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Jan. 22, 1975).
57
Memoranda from Richard Chambers to Associates (July 28, 1975) (two on same date).
58
Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Oct. 2, 1975). See United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), discussed infra, at notes 138–42 and accompanying text.
59
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Oct. 3, 1975).
60
Memorandum from Alfred to Goodwin to Associates (June 4, 1974).
61
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Jan. 16, 1975).
62
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to the Bowen panel, Judge Stanley Barnes and
District Judge Robert Kelleher (C.D. Cal.) (Aug. 28, 1973).
55
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in Bowen, there were scattered votes to go en banc, but the panel itself
then called for an en banc vote, using the opinion to support the call. 63
This led a judge who voted to en banc the case to suggest that “we might
consider taking one or two others that present different aspects of the
problem,” 64 and another proposed taking a post-Almeida-Sanchez en
banc in case the court were to decide against retroactivity. 65
At its next court meeting, the judges agreed to en banc Bowen, but
Chief Judge Chambers, believing strongly that en banc rehearing would
impede the case’s inevitable arrival at the Supreme Court, dissented. 66
He again spoke out on the matter in early 1974, “I do think the situation
is such that we should get our rulings out promptly so the Supreme Court
can take our cases.” 67 To facilitate this, he suggested announcing
decisions with opinions to follow, 68 and Judge Choy agreed with that
suggestion “if this will expedite getting the matters to the Supreme
Court.” 69 As Judge Chambers was to remark a bit later, “All I wanted
was for panels to take various cases [and] get them decided and on the
way to the Supreme Court,” particularly where, in his view, “in this
Almeida chaff, we have never been anything but a way station.” 70
However, even though some colleagues seemed to agree that the
Supreme Court would have the last word, 71 that specific idea was
rejected. 72
As it appeared that Judge Wallace had a majority in Bowen and that
Judge Goodwin would dissent, further extensive discussion among the
judges led to a combined opinion dealing with, and thus reconnecting,

63

Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Sept. 10, 1973).
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Sept. 18, 1973).
65
Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Sept. 19, 1973).
66
“None of the earmarks of the normal case for en banc are here. It is inescapable that the
Supreme Court will decide the questions here. They are too big and too far reaching for that Court to
ignore them. This en banc hearing results in about a three-months’ delay in the case getting to the
Supreme Court,” with district courts meanwhile “almost choked with the retroactive [retroactivity]
question.” In his inimitable style, he ended, “Taking this case en banc is simply flying off into the
air without a payload.” United States v. Bowen, 485 F.2d 1388, 1389 (9th Cir. 1973) (Chambers,
C.J., dissenting from grant of en banc rehearing).
67
Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Jan. 25, 1974).
68
Id.
69
Memorandum from Herbert Choy to Associates (Jan. 28, 1974).
70
Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (Apr. 9, 1974).
71
See, for example, Judge Goodwin, writing to a judge in another circuit: “I do think the
Supreme Court is going to have to straighten this out.” Letter from Alfred T. Goodwin to Reynaldo
Garza (S.D. Tex.) (June 24, 1974).
72
See the comment of Judge J. Clifford Wallace: “I do not think it looks well for our court to
have a matter under submission as long as this, and then file an order indicating that an opinion will
follow later, when we could have done so long ago.” Memorandum to Associates (Jan. 30, 1974).
64
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both issues in one case. That became more necessary as the voting in
Gordon had shifted and resulted in an evenly divided court. 73 Thus, in
Bowen, in two separate 7-6 votes, the court held, first, that immigration
officers could not search vehicles at fixed checkpoints without probable
cause or a warrant, thus applying Almeida-Sanchez to those locations,
but, second, that Almeida-Sanchez should not apply prior to the date of
the Supreme Court’s ruling in that case. 74 On the first point, Judge
Goodwin, using the “reasonable certainty” test, argued that the fixed
checkpoint search in the case was not a search at the functional
equivalent of the border, as the Supreme Court defined it in AlmeidaSanchez. Dissenting, Judge Wallace, who would have remanded to the
district court to determine the search’s reasonableness, pointed to the
facts that only four Justices had outlawed searches at fixed checkpoints
not at the border or its functional equivalent and that Justice Powell’s
concurring opinion was at best limited to roving stops. 75 Judge Wallace
then wrote the majority opinion for those judges who would have limited
the new decision’s retroactivity, reasoning that Almeida-Sanchez was
new law, as it overruled precedent concerning fixed checkpoints;
moreover, freeing those persons arrested prior to June 21, 1973, the date
of Almeida-Sanchez, would not deter future inappropriate police
activity. 76 Judge Hufstedler disagreed as to retroactivity, believing that
Almeida-Sanchez did not establish new precedent, and even if it did, that
would not be pertinent to its retroactivity. 77
Bowen came during the key period for Ninth Circuit border search
en banc decisions of May and June 1974. Two cases—Bowen and
United States v. Peltier 78 —were handed down on May 9, and three more
came down on June 14. There had been no panel ruling in Peltier. It
was thus an “initial en banc,” that is, without a formal disposition first
having been filed by the panel. The case was taken en banc at the April
10 court and council meeting for the purpose that, as Judge Goodwin
stated in his proposed opinion, “the full court can consider whether the
rule announced by the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez should be
applied to similar cases pending on appeal on the date the Supreme
Court’s decision was announced.” 79 With the court again dividing 7-6,
73

There is no record of this action in the Federal Reporter; perhaps no formal filing was

made.
74

United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam).
Id. at 981 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
76
Id. at 965.
77
Id. at 982 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
78
United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
79
Draft opinion (n.d.), in casefile. In a memorandum during later en banc activity in a case
75
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the majority did apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to roving border
patrol search cases in which appeals were pending on June 21, 1973, on
the basis that Almeida-Sanchez did not overrule precedent, 80 while Judge
Wallace repeated his view that it did establish new law and argued that
Stovall v. Denno, 81 permitting prospective application only, should
apply. 82 The interrelation between the various cases the court was
considering en banc could again be seen in a comment by Judge
Goodwin’s law clerk that “the court decided that Peltier and Bowen
would go down as separate, self-sufficient opinions with neither one
citing the other,” but Judge Wallace’s Peltier dissent “quotes extensively
from his majority opinion in Bowen.” 83
Several other en banc rulings were part and parcel of this
considerable activity. In one, the court was unable to resolve the
question posed because the en banc court divided evenly. In that case, a
panel had withheld submission of a case until after the Supreme Court
decided Almeida-Sanchez. A panel member then wrote to his colleagues
that if the report of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Los Angeles
Times were true, the district court would have to be reversed, but in a
companion case the result would be affirmance, as the latter case
involved a checkpoint. 84 Judge Goodwin, a member of the panel,
agreed, as the stop had been on the same highway as the stop in AlmeidaSanchez, but said that case “leaves checkpoint searches to another
day.” 85 The panel, quoting from Justice Powell’s concurrence, ruled in
an unreported order that the Supreme Court’s ruling required reversal of
a conviction from a roving search. However, within a month, before the
mandate was issued, the panel withdrew its order “when the government
pointed out that the retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez had not been
on standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, Judge Goodwin wrote to his colleagues,
“Members of the court will recall that a good deal of paperwork was occasioned by the failure of our
court to deal with the retroactivity problems in the slipstream of Almeida-Sanchez. The Supreme
Court eventually solved our problem, but there was still a lot of paper shuffling connected with the
operation. It is hoped that we can avoid some of this by focusing on these problems on a pre-need
basis.” Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Sept. 9, 1977) (re Cooper v.
Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc)). The judge more recently has referred to the
“tedious retroactivity question” that faced the court in the border-search cases. Email from Alfred T.
Goodwin to author (Apr. 14, 2010, 17:30 EDT) (on file with author).
80
Peltier, 500 F.2d 985.
81
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
82
Peltier, 500 F.2d at 990 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
83
Memorandum from Donald Friedman (law clerk to Judge Goodwin) to Judge Goodwin
(Apr. 19, 1974).
84
Memorandum from Stanley Barnes to panel (June 22, 1973) (re United States v. Gordon,
No. 73-1524). The other case was United States v. Hendrix, No. 73-1523.
85
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to panel (June 26, 1973).
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conceded” 86 and asked the parties to brief the retroactivity question. At
year’s end, the entire court withdrew the case from the panel for en banc
consideration, “for the purpose of deciding whether in a roving search
case coming under the decision in Almeida-Sanchez, the AlmeidaSanchez decision is retroactive.” 87 This was consonant with Judge
Goodwin’s earlier suggestion that the court consider separating the
retroactivity question “from the other compound questions involved in
the ‘functional equivalent’ cases,” 88 and Gordon had been one of the
cases he noted.
Then, illustrating that en banc rehearings don’t always resolve
matters, changes within the court served to preclude a decision on the
question for which the case had been en banc’d. This problem stemmed
from courts of appeals not always having an odd number of sitting
judges, coupled with any senior judge being able to sit on en banc
rehearing of the case. Thus, even with an odd number of active judges,
adding a senior judge to the en banc court might produce a tie vote,
something that happened in Gordon. One of the panel members, Senior
Judge Stanley Barnes, had been thought to favor retroactivity. Had he so
voted, an 8-6 vote in that direction would have resulted. However, he
changed his position, with the result that “we have an evenly divided
court and there is nothing to do with Gordon except to affirm by an
equally divided court,” 7-7. 89 That, said Judge Duniway, “leaves the
question of retroactivity in roving search cases still up in the air, a result
that none of us wanted to have happen.” 90 When the court of appeals
later considered whether to appoint a lawyer for Gordon to file a
certiorari petition, another Supreme Court case, holding that there was no
right to a lawyer at that stage of the proceedings, 91 came into play. One
judge predicted wrongly that “no doubt the Supreme Court will
recognize this as a cert case a mile off—without a lawyer’s help,” 92 and
certiorari was denied on June 30, 1975. 93
Gordon may have failed of resolution, but it illustrates the
interconnectedness of the court’s en banc rulings on border searches. In
his revised Bowen opinion, Judge Goodwin applied Almeida-Sanchez to
fixed checkpoints and then applied the retroactivity rule of the parallel
86

As reported by Alfred T. Goodwin, memorandum to all active judges, others (Dec. 1973).
As explained later in a memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Mar. 29, 1974).
88
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to all active judges, others (Dec. 14, 1973).
89
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Mar. 29, 1974).
90
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Mar. 29, 1974).
91
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
92
Memorandum from James Browning to Associates (July 16, 1974).
93
Gordon v. United States, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
87
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pending Gordon en banc ruling to fixed checkpoints. 94 The close
connection was also clear when Judge Hufstedler complained
simultaneously about Judge Wallace’s dissents in both cases as “contrary
to the controlling authority of Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion for a
majority of the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez,” with a
“misread[ing of] the effect of Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion”
there. 95 Judge Duniway made clear the difficulties caused by that
interconnectedness: “We originally agreed that the retroactivity problems
would be settled in the Gordon case and that the fixed checkpoint
problem would be settled primarily in the Bowen case” and “we
separated the two cases for that reason.” 96 However, another judge had
said Judge Wallace “proposes that we do not reach the issue of the fixed
checkpoint.” 97 Judge Duniway feared that Judge Wallace’s proposed
majority opinion would mean that “all of the work, discussion, etc. of
thirteen of us on the fixed checkpoint question will go down the drain.
That is a hell of a way to run a railroad.” 98
Also in play was the seemingly technical matter of which case was
to be filed first, as the first case to be filed would govern those following
and might foreclose certain rulings in them. The en banc coordinator
thus proposed to his colleagues that several en banc rulings be filed
simultaneously. 99 Before Gordon fell by the wayside, there was even a
relatively sharp exchange between two judges as to whether Gordon or
Bowen would be filed first, with a disputed claim that an agreement had
been reached on the matter. 100 However, other judges made clear that
they wished to avoid a rush to file but wanted the matter handled
systematically and by agreement. For example, as Judge Duniway put it,
“I think it is not good for us to have a race to the clerk’s office in order to
make our personal views the law of the circuit in this area.” 101
In the situation left by Gordon, the judges began to consider other
cases—on which Judge Barnes had not served—that would present the
retroactivity question without complications. One of Judge Merrill’s law
clerks, writing about a “clean Almeida-Sanchez type case” that could be

94

See supra, text accompanying notes 74–76.
Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Feb. 19, 1974).
96
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Feb. 25, 1974).
97
Memorandum from Charles Merrill to Associates (Feb. 25, 1974).
98
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Feb. 25, 1974).
99
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Stanley Barnes, Associates (Apr. 16, 1974).
100
Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Apr. 1, 1974) (Gordon to be filed
first); memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to Associates (Apr. 8, 1974) (no such recollection, and
explanation of events).
101
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Sept. 10, 1973).
95
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used as a substitute for Gordon, thought that Peltier “might be suitable as
an en banc substitute . . . to dispose of the Almeida-Sanchez retroactivity
issue,” although Peltier “is not as pure as Almeida-Sanchez itself.” 102
A case that the court did take en banc led to a clear outcome on one
point, the status of the San Onofre (San Clemente) checkpoint on I-5
sixty-five miles north of the Mexican border. 103 Slightly over two weeks
after the Supreme Court handed down Almeida-Sanchez, the case was
heard by a panel of Judges Goodwin and Wallace and District Judge
William M. Byrne, Sr. (C.D. Cal.). The panel decided to affirm the
marijuana conviction, but Judge Goodwin’s law clerk argued that
Almeida-Sanchez was not limited to roving searches “but rather applies
to all surveillance by the Border Patrol along inland roadways as distinct
from searches at the border itself or its functional equivalents.” 104 When
Judge Byrne circulated his proposed opinion on October 9, the clerk
made the same point again, more directly: “This opinion can not stand.
Apparently at the time that it was decided and assigned, the panel
thought that Almeida-Sanchez did not apply to fixed checkpoint
searches. Judge Byrne never got the word that times have changed.” 105
Saying he would concur, Judge Wallace thought Judge Byrne’s opinion
should be held “until we have taken the various Almeida-Sanchez issue
cases en banc.” He then went further to suggest that Judge Goodwin
“might consider taking this one en banc because it is a permanent
checkpoint and has no other significant issues” that would muddy the
waters. 106
By month’s end, the court ordered the case reheard en banc in
conjunction with Bowen, with Chief Judge Chambers dissenting from
this action as he had in Bowen. 107 In June 1974, a month after deciding
Bowen en banc and the same day that the Brignoni-Ponce en banc
decision was handed down, in United States v. Morgan an 11-2 en banc
court, in a very brief per curiam opinion written by Judge Goodwin, held
that the San Onofre checkpoint was not the functional equivalent of the
border, under Almeida-Sanchez and Bowen. 108 However, because Bowen
had held Almeida-Sanchez not applicable to fixed checkpoint searches
102

Memorandum from Stephanie [no last name] (law clerk) to Charles Merrill (Apr. 1, 1974);
confirmed in memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Apr. 3, 1974).
103
The checkpoint is the San Clemente checkpoint, which is in San Onofre.
104
Memorandum from Don Friedman (law clerk) to Judge Goodwin (Aug. 22, 1973) (re
United States v. Morgan, No. 73-1669).
105
Memorandum from Don Friedman to Judge Goodwin (Oct. 9, 1973).
106
Memorandum from J. Clifford Wallace to panel (Oct. 12, 1973).
107
Order filed Oct. 31, 1973, United States v. Morgan, No. 73-1669.
108
United States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam).
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prior to June 21, 1973, and because the search in the case took place
before that date, suppression did not apply and the conviction was
affirmed. 109 Judge Wallace (joined by Chief Judge Chambers) dissented
on this point, saying there was an inadequate basis for deciding that the
checkpoint was not the functional equivalent of the border. 110
The en banc court also held, in another per curiam, United States v.
Grijalva-Carrera, that when there was no indication of a border patrol
checkpoint and a border patrol agent parked alongside a road where he
could turn on his headlights and observe the occupants of passing cars
and had instructions to stop all northbound vehicles after dark, a search
of a car was a roving patrol search prohibited by Almeida-Sanchez. 111 A
panel of Chief Judge Chambers, Judge Ozell Trask, and District Judge
Byrne had initially affirmed by unpublished memorandum on November
12, 1972. Almost a year later, on October 12, 1973, Judge Goodwin’s
secretary, while she thought the case “technically not in the en banc
active track yet,” notified the judges about denial of rehearing and
provided the possibility for them to seek en banc “because it appears to
be Almeida-related.” 112 Over another Chambers dissent, the court
shortly thereafter took the case en banc.
Judge Goodwin told his colleagues that the case presented “two
complications” in the way of a clean resolution of the retroactivity
question: all cars, not just some, were being stopped, making the location
“a de facto temporary checkpoint,” and the government “can argue that
this was a Terry-stop to check identification, because it was in a ‘high
crime’ area.” 113 Nonetheless he circulated another proposed per curiam
opinion while setting out several options for disposition of the case and
selecting one “for the pragmatic reason that this is the one the author
would vote for.” 114 The individual views that he hoped his proposal
would prompt were expressed, as Judge Sneed raised questions about the
status of temporary checkpoints, some of which could be little more than
roving patrols. However, the court adopted the Goodwin proposal, and
the opinion came down after the circuit’s Peltier ruling but before the
Supreme Court’s consideration of that case. Because this case was on

109

Id.
Id. at 1351 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111
United States v. Grijalva-Carrera, 500 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam).
112
Memorandum from Helen Murdock (secretary) to Alfred T. Goodwin and clerks (Oct. 12,
110

1973).
113

Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Mar. 28, 1974) (memo in Bowen

114

Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (May 16, 1974).

file).
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appeal when the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez, the circuit’s
Peltier decision on retroactivity applied. 115
The Supreme Court did not deal with Morgan, Grijalva-Carrera, or
Gordon. However, it did take up another June 14, 1974, en banc ruling
on a conviction for transporting aliens. This was another case with no
three-judge panel ruling, but in which the full court, on October 13,
1973, ordered an en banc hearing, Judge Goodwin said, “I don’t want to
seem officious, but the case turned up among those being ‘coordinated,’”
and he offered to write the opinion if Judge Duniway—the most senior
judge participating—“wants to assign it to me.” 116 Judge Duniway,
although saying that he “doubt[ed] that I have any authority to assign it,”
accepted the “invitation” and made that assignment. 117
Judge Goodwin had first noted that this case “may have to be more
than a summary statement of facts” with citations to Almeida-Sanchez
and Peltier, because of the “significant issue” of whether someone
believed to be an alien could be stopped and interrogated about that
matter, something the Tenth Circuit had ruled permissible. 118 The
judge’s law clerk thought the case “closely keyed to the result in
Grijalva-Carrera,” 119 on certain stops being more like those by roving
patrols than those at fixed checkpoints, and Judge Goodwin himself
reported that he had “started to prepare a perfunctory memorandum to
dispose” of the case. However, he said that “two controversial problems,
one or more of which may be under consideration by other panels,” one
being the Tenth Circuit’s position, led him to a more complete proposed
opinion. 120 Further illustrating the interrelation between pending cases,
Judge Goodwin discussed Judge Sneed’s reservations in the pending
Grijalva-Carrera en banc about the status of temporary checkpoints,
which Judge Goodwin wished to resolve “without taking another case en
banc.” 121
Accepting Judge Goodwin’s approach, the Ninth Circuit
unanimously reversed the conviction. 122 The opinion first tied the case

115

United States v. Grijalva-Carrera, 500 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (en banc).
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to the panel (Judges Duniway and Sneed, and
District Judge William Sweigert [N.D. Cal.]) (May 15, 1974) (re United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
No. 73-2161).
117
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Goodwin and panel (May 17, 1974).
118
United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973).
119
Memorandum from Donald Friedman (law clerk) to Judge Goodwin (May 21, 1974).
120
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (May 22, 1974).
121
Id.
122
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
116
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to the court’s own Peltier ruling making Almeida-Sanchez retroactive to
all cases involving roving patrol stops pending on appeal as of the date of
Almeida-Sanchez; because the car had not been stopped at the
checkpoint, the situation was more like a roving patrol than a fixed
checkpoint stop. 123 Then, dealing with the government’s claim that the
case involved not a search but a stop to interrogate about alien status,
Judge Goodwin declined to take the Tenth Circuit’s view, which he
found “entirely inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Almeida-Sanchez” and “with settled law of this circuit” as well. 124 There
was, he said, no “founded suspicion” (necessary for a proper stop) that
those in the car were illegal aliens, the ruling that was to be the core of
the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case.
Return to Panel. The Ninth Circuit initially voted to take en banc two
other cases to resolve outstanding questions but then returned the cases
to their panels for disposition. In one of those cases, District Judge
Robert Peckham (N.D. Cal., sitting by designation) told his panel
colleagues to say that, for him, the difference between roving patrols and
temporary and fixed checkpoints was “a distinction without a
difference.” He suggested that he might write separately in this case, as
he preferred resting the ruling on the Ninth Circuit’s Almeida-Sanchez
decision, which had criticized stops in all three situations, rather than
relying on “a fifth Justice’s neutral statement” (referring to the Powell
concurrence) that the case didn’t involve fixed and temporary
checkpoints. 125 Peckham’s message led fellow panel member Judge
Charles Merrill to write to en banc coordinator Judge Goodwin, “It
begins to look as though the vote of the whole court might be appropriate
on this question.” 126 The court then withdrew the case from the panel
and that case became involved in the Bowen proceedings.
The court decided that Judge Goodwin would write a per curiam
opinion applying Almeida-Sanchez to the San Onofre checkpoint, based
on the reasoning of the then-in-process Bowen. 127 Indeed, Judge
Goodwin circulated a proposed (unpublished) memorandum disposition.
However, he then almost immediately communicated that he had written
the disposition because he thought it “involved only a housekeeping

123

Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1111.
125
Memorandum from Robert Peckham (N.D. Cal.) to panel, United States v. Heiden/United
States v. Klein, No. 73-1471/73-1570 (Aug. 1, 1973).
126
Memorandum from Charles Merrill to Alfred Goodwin, others (Aug. 14, 1973).
127
Internal memorandum in Heiden/Klein case folder (Dec. 18, 1973).
124

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6

26

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

matter controlled by the Bowen retroactivity issue,” when instead the
panel might want to deal with issues in the case other than AlmeidaSanchez retroactivity. For unexplained reasons, the order returning the
case to the panel was not issued until after mid-July 1974. On December
16, 1974, the panel resolved the case on the basis that the stop, which in
any event had occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s Almeida-Sanchez
decision, was valid. 128
The other case involved three defendants convicted of conspiracy to
import marijuana. The panel (Judges Barnes, Goodwin, and J. Blaine
Anderson) had held the case pending the Supreme Court’s determination
of Almeida-Sanchez. They then decided not to apply that ruling because
the stop in the case was at a checkpoint, not by a roving patrol. The
court took the case en banc. However, after handing down Bowen,
applying Almeida-Sanchez to fixed checkpoints only prospectively, and
Morgan, holding that the San Onofre checkpoint was not the equivalent
of the border, the en banc court returned the case to the panel, which then
ruled the search valid because it took place on March 8, 1971, before the
crucial date of June 21, 1973. 129
SUPREME COURT RULINGS
If the May–June 1974 period was the key time for Ninth Circuit en
banc rulings, it was late June 1975 when the Supreme Court weighed in
heavily on border searches. The Court focused in Peltier on retroactivity
and held, by a 5-4 vote, with Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall dissenting, that Almeida-Sanchez was not retroactive to a case
pending on appeal on the date Almeida-Sanchez was announced. Justice
Rehnquist said, “[I]f the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in
good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial” or that
their conduct was within the law, the “imperative of judicial integrity”
was not offended by introduction of that evidence or material seized
through such conduct “even if decisions subsequent to the search or
seizure have broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass” the evidence
or had held that the conduct “is not permitted by the Constitution.” 130

128

United States v. Heiden/United States v. Klein, 508 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Mollet, 510 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1975). The account here is from that
opinion; there is no Federal Reporter citation for the panel’s initial ruling. Judge Anderson,
disagreeing over a sentencing issue, concurred in part and dissented in part. At some point, the
Mollet case had produced another evenly divided en banc court, see memorandum from Alfred T.
Goodwin to Associates (Mar. 28, 1974), but that was before the case was resolved by returning it to
the panel.
130
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1975).
129
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The Court then affirmed the Bowen non-retroactivity ruling, so that,
as to roving patrols, the rule of Almeida-Sanchez would apply from June
21, 1973. 131 For the majority, Justice Powell said that, as the court of
appeals had correctly decided that Almeida-Sanchez was not to be
applied retroactively, “it should have refrained from considering whether
our decision in that case applied to searches at checkpoints” 132 —that is,
the decision extending Almeida-Sanchez to traffic checkpoint searches
was unnecessary. 133
In the Brignoni-Ponce case, which demonstrates the interplay
between the two courts that is at the heart of their interaction dynamics,
Justice Powell again wrote for the Court, affirming the Ninth Circuit.
The timeline for this case is of some note. As Justice Powell
acknowledged, the appeal from the conviction was pending in the Ninth
Circuit when the Supreme Court handed down Almeida-Sanchez. 134 The
government had not challenged the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of
the stop of Brignoni-Ponce as equivalent to one by a roving patrol, the
court’s treating San Clemente as not the functional equivalent of the
border, or its holding on retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez. The key was
that the Court now held that a roving patrol could not stop a car near the
border to question about immigration status where apparent Mexican
ancestry was the only ground for suspicion. 135 Thus, other than at the
border or its functional equivalent, one could stop cars only on
articulable facts that gave rise to reasonable inferences, and if suspicion
led an officer to believe a car had aliens, the officer could stop the
vehicle and question briefly about citizenship. 136 Justice Rehnquist,
while joining the majority opinion, focused on that opinion’s limitation
to the particular type of stop involved, and Justice Douglas joined the
judgment but disagreed with the majority’s “suspicion” test.
The Supreme Court also affirmed the decision in another border
patrol case, United States v. Ortiz. 137 This had been a Ninth Circuit
unpublished disposition invalidating a search at the San Clemente
checkpoint by officers who lacked reasons for suspecting that the car
they stopped contained illegal aliens; the appeals court had also held that
probable cause was needed for all vehicle searches, whether conducted at
131

Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
Id. at 921 (1975).
133
Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on the basis of
their Peltier dissents, and Justice Stewart dissented without comment.
134
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975).
135
Id. at 886-87.
136
Id. at 889.
137
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
132
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checkpoints or by roving patrols. Again speaking through Justice
Powell, the Court held that “at traffic checkpoints removed from the
border and its functional equivalents, officers may not search private
vehicles without consent or probable cause.” 138 Four Justices wrote
three separate concurrences; two concurred only in the judgment, with
only the compulsion of precedent keeping all in the majority. 139 Justice
Rehnquist complained of the extension of Almeida-Sanchez’s “unsound
rule”; 140 Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Blackmun, complained
of the difficulty of stopping the influx of illegal aliens; and Justice
White, also joined by Justice Blackmun, said that the majority’s “largely
foreordained” ruling meant that justifying investigatory stops at
checkpoints without probable cause or reasonable suspicion would be
difficult. 141
The Justices used GVR orders to return two other cases to the Ninth
Circuit for reconsideration in light of both Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz. 142
The cases involved convictions for marijuana possession with intent to
distribute that had been affirmed in unpublished dispositions by
overlapping panels. 143 On remand, both panels affirmed the district court
in published opinions. The panel of Judges Carter, Wallace, and
Jameson acted first, holding on December 5, 1976, that officers had
reasonable suspicion that alien smuggling was occurring when they made
their stop one-and-one-half miles from the border in an area “notorious”
for alien smuggling. 144 After having “re-examined the facts of this case
in light of the[] recent Supreme Court cases” and having discussed the
cases, the judges found no substantive difference between the Ninth
Circuit’s “founded suspicion” test and the “reasonable suspicion” test the
Supreme Court had enunciated in Brignoni-Ponce; they then ruled that
the officers had that “reasonable suspicion.” 145 On January 26, 1976, the
other panel (Judges Wallace, Koelsch, and Jameson), in a brief per
curiam, cited the previous case for the equivalence of the tests and
138

Id. at 896-97.
See id. at 898 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger’s concurring opinion,
which was joined by Justice Blackmun, is reported at United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
899, 899 (1975). Justice White’s concurring opinion, which was also joined by Justice Blackmun, is
reported at id. at 914.
140
Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 898 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
141
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 915 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
142
Rocha-Lopez v. United States, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975); Gonzalez-Diaz v. United States, 422
U.S. 1053 (1975).
143
Judges Carter and Wallace and District Judge William Jameson (D. Mont.); Wallace,
Jameson, and Judge Oliver Koelsch.
144
United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1976).
145
Id. at 476-77.
139
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repeated key language from its previous unpublished order. Judge
Koelsch noted in his dissent that the record did not support “founded
suspicion” in this case. 146
THE LATER CASES
All was not yet completed. A late 1975 memorandum from Judge
Shirley Hufstedler indicated not only many cases but many categories of
cases (she listed seven) that were yet to be decided. 147 To cover all
issues, she suggested a published opinion for each of several categories
and memorandum dispositions for the other categories and all non-lead
cases. And there was to be another Supreme Court border search ruling
and two more en banc matters, one of which had commenced in 1974 but
was not resolved until early 1977, 148 and another that became necessary
when, as had happened with Gordon, the first failed to produce an
outcome on the issue it was intended to resolve. 149
The first of the en banc cases, Martinez-Fuerte, involved
convictions of several defendants for transporting aliens, stopped at the
seemingly ubiquitous San Clemente fixed checkpoint and diverted to a
secondary area. The panel majority of Judge Duniway and District Judge
Stanley Weigel (N.D. Cal.) affirmed the district judge’s order
suppressing evidence from the ensuing interrogation and reversed the
conviction. 150 Judge Duniway wrote that a warrant of inspection
allowing stopping all cars without probable cause or even the Ninth
Circuit’s “founded suspicion” test did not justify otherwise unreasonable
searches and that, indeed, a traffic immigration checkpoint under an
inspection warrant was constitutionally unreasonable. 151 “Talking back”
to a Supreme Court Justice, Judge Duniway indicated that he was
troubled by Justice Powell’s proposal of an administrative inspection
analogy for roving patrols, and he rejected as “unsatisfactory” Powell’s
premise that an area warrant would justify a fixed checkpoint. 152 Judge
146

United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 528 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). For the Ninth
Circuit “founded suspicion” cases and particularly the use of unpublished dispositions in such cases,
see Michael Wepsiec & Stephen L. Wasby, Ninth Circuit Border Searches: Doctrines and
Inconsistencies (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
147
Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Oct. 2, 1975).
148
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
149
United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974) (panel), withdrawn, 568
F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1976).
150
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 428 U.S. 543
(1976).
151
Id. at 314.
152
Id. at 318.
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Carter, dissenting, would, on the basis of the magistrate-issued warrant,
have upheld the stop, the limited visual inspection, and the occasional
resulting interrogation. 153 Reviving the question of what the Supreme
Court had said in Almeida-Sanchez, he said the panel majority made it
seem as if Justice Powell was alone, but “a breakdown of votes” showed
that a majority of the Court (Justice Powell concurring and Justice White
and colleagues in dissent) would support the government’s action here. 154
When Martinez-Fuerte reached the high court along with a Fifth
Circuit case, 155 Justice Powell noted the Ninth Circuit panel’s focus on
the constitutionality of the warrant of inspection under which the
checkpoint was operating. 156 However, for the Supreme Court, the
question was vehicle stops at fixed checkpoints for brief questioning,
even when the stop was made without reason to believe the vehicles
contained illegal aliens. Justice Powell said this question had been
reserved in Ortiz, and the government had preserved it in the court of
appeals. 157 Powell held for a 7-2 court (Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissenting) that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the
challenged stops and questioning. When the Ninth Circuit received the
case on remand, the panel affirmed the conviction and remanded the
other two defendants’ cases for further proceedings under the Supreme
Court’s ruling. 158
Juarez-Rodriguez, the en banc case that had begun first, was to lead
to the same result as in Gordon—an evenly divided court, failing to
provide a precedential ruling. After the Ninth Circuit’s Bowen en banc, a
panel of Chief Judge Chambers, Judge Browning, and District Judge
Fred Taylor (D. Idaho) had reversed another conviction in a short per
curiam on May 21, 1974. 159 Citing the Ninth Circuit’s Almeida-Sanchez
and Bowen rulings, the panel said that without founded suspicion and
probable cause, the stop and search of defendant’s car at the San
Clemente checkpoint violated Fourth Amendment rights. As the search

153

Id. at 323 (Carter, J., dissenting).
Id. Judge Carter did, however, concede that Justice Powell was not talking about fixed
checkpoints but about roving patrols.
155
Sifuentes v. United States, 517 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1975), rev’d, United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
156
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 549 n.5, 562 n.15 (1976).
157
Id. at 545.
158
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 538 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1976).
159
United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974), withdrawn, 568 F.2d 120
(9th Cir. 1976).
154
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had taken place after June 21, 1973, Almeida-Sanchez’s non-retroactivity
“as applied to fixed alien checkpoints . . . need not concern us.” 160
The case became en banc fodder because of a desire for full court
consideration of a fixed checkpoint search after the date of AlmeidaSanchez but before May 9, 1974, the date of Bowen. In early May 1974,
Judge Goodwin had agreed with suggestions by Judges Browning and
Trask to take en banc a fixed checkpoint case, but he thought the court
and council should discuss the matter. 161 Between the initial panel action
and this point, the court en banc had transferred the case to a panel of
Judges Choy, Barnes, and Hufstedler. This action resulted from Chief
Judge Chambers’s suggestion that a lead case be taken from among those
decided by three circuit judges (that is, with no district or out-of-circuit
judges on the panel); Judges Herbert Choy, Barnes, and Hufstedler had
been drawn by lot. 162 Judge Browning withdrew his en banc suggestion
when Judge Hufstedler filed her dissent to Judge Barnes’s majority
opinion for the panel. The case rested in this posture for almost two
years without being filed, until Judge Hufstedler called for en banc
hearing as “the guinea pig case of ‘retroactivity’ of Ortiz . . . affect[ing]
dozens of cases which we have backed up on the court awaiting the
determination of the panel.” 163 Judge Goodwin then asked the court’s
judges whether they agreed with the proposed Barnes or Hufstedler
opinions, 164 which differed basically on whether Almeida-Sanchez
extended to fixed checkpoints (Barnes no, Hufstedler yes). 165
Here internal court procedure reared its head, illustrating the
institutional mechanisms playing a part in intercourt dynamics. First,
Judge Hufstedler circulated an order, with which many of her colleagues
concurred, “to unsnarl some procedural snags to get this case sanitized
for the Supreme Court”—to straighten out some mis-recording
concerning the order transferring the case (and others) to the special
panel and correcting an error as to who was on the en banc court, as
Judge Oliver Koelsch had taken senior status and could not participate in

160

Id.
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (May 2, 1974). Judge Trask had
written to his colleagues, concurring with Judge Browning’s suggestion, “to en banc (without
argument) a post-Almeida-Sanchez situation at a fixed checkpoint, for clarification purposes.”
Memorandum from Ozell Trask to Associates (Apr. 29, 1974).
162
Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (July 28, 1975).
163
Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Feb. 23, 1976). Judge Hufstedler
put “retroactivity” in quotation marks because, as she stated in her draft dissent, she thought the case
did not implicate retroactivity.
164
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Associates (Mar. 19, 1976).
165
See, e.g., memorandum from Stanley Barnes to Associates (Oct. 14, 1975).
161
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it. 166 The next development was a question raised by Judge Choy 167 and
by Judge Hufstedler that was more crucial—whether the en banc court,
rather than directly taking the case en banc, had the jurisdictional
authority to transfer to the special panel cases already heard by another
panel. The result was, as Judge Hufstedler put it, “a sorry procedural
morass.” 168 Further court consideration, with the case still in limbo and
issuance of the mandate stayed, led to a July 2, 1976, order withdrawing
the case from the special panel, to be considered en banc.
Difficulties with this case were not yet over, however, in part as a
result of the time necessary to resolve those procedural issues. By the
time of the vote to en banc the case, Judge Barnes had also taken senior
status, so Chief Judge Chambers assigned to panel member Judge Choy
the writing of opinion for what had been the Barnes majority panel, and
Choy wrote based in large measure on what Judge Barnes had stated.
Further, on June 6, 1975, the Supreme Court decided Martinez-Fuerte,
which led to some inconclusive disputation as to whether it affected the
present case.
The Juarez-Rodriguez en banc court’s 6-5 decision (Choy for the
majority, Hufstedler for the dissenters) was first announced on
November 16, 1976. 169 Judge Choy said the question was whether
Almeida-Sanchez applied to stops, without consent or probable cause, at
permanent traffic checkpoints not at the border or its functional
equivalent made after June 21, 1973 (Supreme Court Almeida-Sanchez)
and before May 9, 1974 (Ninth Circuit Bowen en banc)—essentially
whether Ortiz should be retroactive. He believed that language in Ortiz
did not indicate that the Court had ruled on checkpoint searches or that
Almeida-Sanchez held them invalid. Moreover, Judge Choy said that
prior to Bowen no holding gave law enforcement adequate notice of the
unconstitutionality of such fixed checkpoint searches; thus retroactive
application would be improper. Judge Sneed disagreed with Judge Choy.
Sneed thought the Supreme Court had had ample opportunity to hold that
Ortiz was not retroactive to the period from June 21, 1973, to June 30,
1975, the date of Ortiz itself, and thus the Supreme Court had selected
June 21, 1973, as the critical date. Judge Sneed’s vote had at first been
considered to be with the majority but when that vote was added to the

166

Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (May 12, 1976).
Memorandum from Herbert Choy to Associates (May 27, 1976).
168
Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (May 24, 1976). As she put it, “What
a sorry bog we have found ourselves in by not taking the case en banc in the first place.”
169
Because of its outcome, as with Gordon, there is no Federal Reporter citation for this case
and the account of the opinion is drawn from the case files.
167
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Hufstedler dissent, the court was divided evenly, 6-6, and, on January 10,
1977, the court amended its ruling to show affirmance by that division.
Even before their final order, the judges realized that they had gone
to considerable lengths to resolve an issue but had come up empty. As
Judge Duniway put it, “Having decided it in a manner that doesn’t
amount to a precedent, we are no better off than we were before.” 170 But
what to do? “[T]ake another one of the cases en banc, assuming we can
find one,” said Judge Hufstedler, who pointed out that it was necessary to
find a case in which a senior judge had sat on the panel and could thus sit
on the en banc court to make a court of thirteen judges, which could not
divide evenly. 171 Judge Duniway then noted, however, that when Chief
Judge Chambers took senior status, the number of active judges would be
only eleven, facilitating a result in which the court would not be evenly
divided. 172 In searching for cases, Judge Browning found United States
v. Escalante, which was still pending before the panel of Judges
Chambers, Browning, and Taylor, which had first heard JuarezRodriguez, and Browning reported that if the court took the case en banc,
Judge Chambers would opt out of the en banc, providing an oddnumbered en banc court. 173
The Escalante panel had suspended submission of the case and
then, on May 21, 1974, issued a very brief unpublished memorandum
reversing the district court, citing Almeida-Sanchez and Bowen. 174 When
Judge Browning’s suggestion that the Escalante case replace the failed
Juarez-Rodriguez en banc was accepted, Browning, now chief judge,
assigned the opinions to those who had written in Juarez-Rodriguez. 175
As the judges now had information about the voting of judges who had
participated in Juarez-Rodriguez, it quickly became clear that the
determining vote would be that of the court’s newest member, Judge J.
Blaine Anderson, who had not participated earlier, 176 and it was
suggested that Judge Anderson should vote first. When he sided with
Judge Choy’s view, 177 Judge Goodwin assigned Judge Choy the court’s
proposed majority opinion, and the final opinion, filed on May 31,

170

Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Dec. 6, 1976).
Memorandum from Shirley Hufstedler to Associates (Dec. 3, 1976).
172
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (Dec. 6, 1976).
173
Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Dec. 14, 1976).
174
United States v. Escalante, No. 74-1075 (9th Cir. May 21, 1974).
175
Memorandum from James R. Browning to active judges (Jan. 6, 1977).
176
See memorandum from Herbert Choy to Associates (Jan. 7, 1977).
177
Memorandum from J. Blaine Anderson to Associates (Jan. 27, 1977).
171
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1977, 178 held that Almeida-Sanchez did not apply to permanent checking
searches between that ruling and the Bowen en banc.
Judge Choy’s majority view was that the Supreme Court’s Ortiz
ruling “neither indicates that the Court at any time previously had ruled
on checkpoint searches, nor even implies that Almeida-Sanchez held
checkpoint searches invalid.” 179 It was Ortiz that for the first time held
Almeida-Sanchez applicable to checkpoints not at the border; prior to the
Ninth Circuit’s Bowen ruling, there was “no holding giving law
enforcement agencies adequate notice of the unconstitutionality of fixed
checkpoint searches conducted without probable cause or consent.” 180 In
short, until Ortiz and Bowen, there had been no adequate notice to law
enforcement. Judge Hufstedler dissented for several judges to say what
she had proposed to say earlier in Juarez-Rodriguez: “No retroactivity
issue is presented by United States v. Ortiz” 181 and that case announced
no new doctrine, so it should be applicable to the cases at issue. 182 The
Supreme Court denied review. 183
TYPES OF INTERACTION
In the interaction between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court
over border searches, there were, of course, many more cases that did not
reach the Supreme Court. But what were the types of interactions
between the two courts? A number of these aspects became evident in
the post-Almeida-Sanchez dynamics, and they are identified here without
suggesting what would lead to particular effects or whether certain types
of effects would increase after particular judicial rulings.
Before proceeding to some analysis, we note some additional
instances in which the Supreme Court’s rulings interacted not only with
the Ninth Circuit decisions discussed thus far but with other circuit
precedents, including those on the “founded suspicion” necessary for a
stop. In one case, a panel of liberal judges Walter Ely and Shirley
Hufstedler and a district judge ruled that “founded suspicion” justifying

178

United States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
Id. at 972.
180
Id. at 972-73.
181
Id. at 973 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
182
One of Judge Goodwin’s law clerks, Mickey Bierman, had disagreed with the Choy
opinion and spoke of the problems involved in holding Ortiz non-retroactive. Memorandum from
Mickey Bierman to Judge Goodwin (n.d.). On the memorandum’s face, the judge had written, “I
agree with Bierman J,” and he joined the Hufstedler dissent, as he had in Juarez-Rodriguez.
183
Escalante v. United States, 434 U.S. 862 (1977), denying cert. to 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir.
1077) (en banc).
179
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the stop was lacking. They noted that “[t]he Government has attempted
to save this border patrol rover case from the impact of Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States” and the Ninth Circuit’s own Brignoni-Ponce en banc
“on the ground that the border agent had a founded suspicion justifying
his making an investigatory stop under the authority of United States v.
Bugarin-Casas (9th Cir. 1973) 484 F.2d 853.” 184 In another case, in
which the majority held there was founded suspicion, Judge Hufstedler
wrote separately to say she had to concur “under the compulsion of the
founded suspicion cases in this Circuit” but went on to observe, “I am
unable to reconcile the rationale of Almeida-Sanchez . . . forbidding stops
and searches of vehicles at nonborders without probable cause, and our
founded suspicion cases permitting stops of vehicles beyond the border
on less than probable cause.” 185
I. Direct Action. At times, after a Supreme Court ruling, the court of
appeals acted directly. For example, the Ninth Circuit disposed of a
1974 case by finding the stop of defendant’s car unlawful under both
Almeida-Sanchez and the Bowen en banc, so that the discovered
marijuana from the stop and search should have been suppressed. 186
Another panel dealing with a stop and search at a fixed checkpoint after
Almeida-Sanchez said that without the fruit of the search, successful
prosecution was not possible, requiring reversal with instructions to
dismiss the indictment. 187
Despite an apparent inclination to wait for the Supreme Court, the
court of appeals did not suspend judgment in all instances where
questions related to Almeida-Sanchez were before the Supreme Court
and resolved some cases directly on grounds other than those involved in
the Supreme Court’s ruling. In one case, the judges, while noting that
such questions were indeed pending, said they need not delay their
disposition reversing a conviction. 188 The panel judges, using an
unpublished disposition, said that they assumed that the initial stop and
search for aliens was valid but agreed that when the search commenced,
there was no probable cause to search for contraband and the statute
authorized searches only for aliens. Because the search could not be
upheld as a “border search,” the agents had to have probable cause.
184

United States v. Madriz-Villaneuva, No. 74-1293 (9th Cir. July 1974). The BugarinCasas case held that founded suspicion existed when officers saw a low-riding station wagon with a
compartment that could hide aliens.
185
United States v. Whitmarsh, No. 74-1881 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 1974).
186
United States v. Luna, No. 74-1115 (9th Cir. May 21, 1974).
187
United States v. Thompson, No. 74-1352 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 1975).
188
United States v. Lopez, Nos. 73-1866, 73-1867 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 1974).
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There were also convictions affirmed as clearly involving a border
search and thus not covered by Almeida-Sanchez. 189 Other affirmances
resulted when the defendant failed to raise the Almeida-Sanchez issue at
trial, particularly after that decision was decided; this was especially
obvious when the point had not been raised at the time of a trial six
months after the Supreme Court had ruled. 190 Still other efforts to bring
cases within Almeida-Sanchez were unavailing, and simply claiming that
a case was a “border search” did not become a talisman for undoing
convictions. For example, a panel, finding that a search was of
abandoned property or a justifiable border search, said that unattended
golf carts in a no-man’s-land desert area twenty-six miles from a golf
course provided probable cause for any officer. 191 In still another
instance, the court, explicitly accepting Almeida-Sanchez, affirmed
because only “reasonable suspicion” was necessary to require a car to
halt and for the officer to make the inquiry, which provided probable
cause. 192
II. Action on Petition for Rehearing. In some instances, the Supreme
Court’s ruling was applied to the filing of a petition for rehearing
(PFR), including some PFRs filed on the basis of the Justices’ decision.
Examples were unpublished decisions allowing filing of a rehearing
petition because the facts of the case were within Almeida-Sanchez 193 or
even when, according to the judges, the case was probably
distinguishable from Almeida-Sanchez. 194 In other cases, the court
granted the government’s petition for rehearing, vacated its prior
disposition, and affirmed a conviction because of the Supreme Court’s
1975 ruling in Peltier, 195 providing examples of how the court of appeals
changed its position after the Supreme Court’s ruling in that case. Two
other memorandum dispositions were likewise withdrawn and
convictions affirmed on the authority of Peltier. 196 In another instance, a
189

E.g., United States v. Sanchez, 73-1142 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 1973).
United States v. Ratcliff, 74-1931 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1974); see also United States v.
Castenada-Campos, No. 73-1824 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1973).
191
United States v. Getchel, No. 73-1868 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1973).
192
United States v. Perez-Ramos, No. 73-1811 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1973).
193
United States v. Flores-Ramos, No. 73-1040 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 1973).
194
United States v. Rios-Aguirre, 73-1030 (9th Cir. 1973). Distinguishing another case, a
panel rejected an attempt to assimilate the facts in a case to Almeida-Sanchez. United States v.
Hernandez-Padilla, No. 73-2225 (9th Cir. 1973).
195
United States v. Rummonds, No. 73-1751 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 1975); United States v.
Mammari/United States v. Hutchings, Nos. 73-2340, 73-2391 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1975).
196
United States v. Ganelin, No. 73-2669 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1975), and United States v.
Sanchez-Sanchez, No. 73-2343 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1975).
190
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panel had reversed a conviction on the authority of Almeida-Sanchez and
the circuit’s own ruling in Peltier and had remanded for consideration of
Wilson v. Porter, 197 the court’s leading ruling on “founded suspicion” to
make a stop. 198 After receiving the government’s PFR, the court called
for a response from defendants, one of whom filed a stipulation that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Peltier meant the PFR should be granted and
the conviction affirmed on the basis of that decision. And the court did
just that. 199
When, in still another case, a defendant did not respond to the
government’s PFR, the court granted rehearing, withdrew its earlier
disposition, and affirmed the conviction in another unpublished ruling.200
When a panel had initially reversed a conviction because the court’s own
Peltier en banc decision had applied Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to
roving border patrols, the court of appeals granted a government petition
for rehearing because of the Supreme Court Peltier ruling and vacated its
prior order. Affirming the conviction was compelled because the
Supreme Court had held Almeida-Sanchez not applicable to pre-June 21,
1973, searches. 201
In addition to applying Supreme Court rulings after a PFR filing,
court of appeals panels recalled mandates and invited the parties to brief
the retroactivity question, which in effect extended the period in which a
PFR could be filed. 202 This had the effect of recognizing both the
application of Almeida-Sanchez itself and a major question not answered
directly by the Supreme Court’s ruling—the retroactivity matter. One of
these cases later became the Gordon en banc case. 203
III. Remand After Supreme Court Ruling. Some panels remanded cases
for district court consideration of the effect of the Supreme Court’s
ruling, regularly using unpublished dispositions to do so. Indicative of
the remands after Supreme Court rulings was one case a panel sent back
197

361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966).
United States v. Gonzales-Rosales/United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, Nos. 73-1533, 721534 (9th Cir. 1974).
199
United States v. Gonzalez-Rosales/United States v. Bertran-Gutierrez, Nos. 73-1533, 731534 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 1976); United States v. Stark, No. 72-3004, 538 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1976)
(table).
200
United States v. Smith, No. 72-3106 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 1976).
201
United States v. Carpenter, No. 74-1403 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1975).
202
See memorandum from James Carter to Associates and senior judges (July 20, 1973), and
memorandum from Richard Chambers to Shirley Hufstedler, Associates (July 23, 1973), indicating
such action in United States v. Flores-Ramos, No. 73-1040 (9th Cir. July 6, 1973).
203
United States v. Gordon, No. 73-1524; see memorandum from Stanley Barnes to
Associates (Aug. 23, 1973).
198
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to the district court for a ruling on the validity of a “stop” in light of the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Ortiz, Bowen, and Brignoni-Ponce. 204 As
well, immediately after the Supreme Court had decided Martinez-Fuerte,
several Ninth Circuit panels remanded cases to the district court for
reconsideration in light of it, adding in one, “It is indicated that the
district court will wish to vacate its suppression order and proceed with
the trial of the case.” 205
Many such remands took place concerning Almeida-Sanchez, 206
including the then not-yet-reached question of its retroactivity.207 In one
such remand, the panel said that the district court “will wish to consider
whether it is a case on inland checkpoints in the slipstream of AlmeidaSanchez . . . or whether it can rest on grounds independent of the law of
the validity of required stops at fixed or semi-fixed checkpoints for a
search for aliens.” The court also suggested that the case be held for the
pending Bowen en banc ruling after the Supreme Court had vacated the
panel ruling there and remanded for further consideration. 208 Another
panel sent a roving patrol case back to the district court on the theory that
the Supreme Court’s decision might have made a difference because, on
the record before the panel, one could conclude only that the district
court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s Almeida-Sanchez ruling, but it “might
have ruled differently had it had the benefit of the decision of the
Supreme Court reversing” that ruling. 209
With respect to some cases containing an issue as to AlmeidaSanchez’s applicability to fixed checkpoints, it was suggested that “the
proper course is to remand such cases to the district court to determine
whether a search at the relevant checkpoint was the ‘functional
equivalent’ of a border search” under Justice Stewart’s opinion. 210 In
one such case, the panel’s author argued that the government’s position
made it unnecessary to remand for such determinations, but, during the
time when judges were seeking cases to take en banc, he circulated his
proposed opinion to the full court and withheld filing it “until all
204

United States v. DeEvans, No. 74-2358 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 1975).
United States v. Arechiga-Moran, No. 75-3383 (9th Cir. July 28, 1976); see also United
States v. Wise, No. 75-3014 (9th Cir. July 28, 1976); United States v. Diaz-Perez, No. 74-2153 (9th
Cir. July 28, 1976).
206
E.g., United States v. Baca, No. 73-2048 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973); United States v.
Lindsay, No. 73-2205 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973).
207
United States v. Carpenter, No. 73-2010 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973).
208
United States v. Holley, No. 73-1079 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 1974).
209
Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to J. Clifford Wallace, District Judge Matthew
Byrne, Sr., Associates (July 16, 1973) (re United States v. Gonzales-Rodriguez, No. 73-1533, and
United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, No. 73-1534).
210
Memorandum from James R. Browning to Associates (Aug. 15, 1973).
205
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members of the court have had time to look into the matter and express
their own views on the subject.” 211
IV. Remand in Light of Ninth Circuit Ruling. The court of appeals also
remanded in light of its own rulings. It did this, for example, after its
Bowen en banc ruling. Indeed, at least one judge, admitting he had been
“guilty already of joining in reversal of some Almeida-Sanchez cases” on
the basis of the court’s Bowen ruling, suggested that the cases be
remanded, not reversed, because “[t]he Supreme Court usually gives us
this consideration.” 212 Roving border patrol cases on appeal at the time
of Almeida-Sanchez were remanded for reconsideration under the Ninth
Circuit’s own follow-up en banc ruling in Peltier. 213 Here, the judges
had more in mind than a routine look at a new case; when they
remanded, they added, “It seems to be indicated that the judgment should
be vacated and, if the government has no additional evidence, the
indictment dismissed.” 214 Likewise, in deciding two cases on permanent
checkpoint border searches in which aliens had been found, a panel
vacated one for reconsideration under Almeida-Sanchez and Bowen
because the court’s Bowen ruling had applied Almeida-Sanchez to
permanent checkpoints, 215 but it directly affirmed the other because of
Bowen’s holding that Almeida-Sanchez would not be applied to searches
that took place before June 21, 1973. 216
Cases were also remanded because the questions they raised
required further lower court action independent of what the Supreme
Court might say. Thus in one case, when the court’s Bowen and
Brignoni-Ponce en bancs applying Almeida-Sanchez to fixed checkpoints
were “now before the Supreme Court on certiorari” and the related
Martinez-Fuerte inspection warrant case was also pending, the judges
said that “ordinarily we might either take this case under submission or
remand it to the district court, awaiting the decision of the Supreme
Court.” 217 Instead, remand was in order because another Ninth Circuit
case had distinguished between certain observations of a moving vehicle

211

Memorandum from Alfred T. Goodwin to Judge Walter Ely, District Judge William East,
Associates (June 12, 1974) (re United States v. Nava-Bibayoff, No. 74-1099/United States v.
Esquer-Rivera, No. 74-1110).
212
Memorandum from Richard Chambers to Associates (May 22, 1974).
213
United States v. Flores-Ramos, No. 73-1040 (9th Cir. June 5, 1974); United States v.
Rummonds, No. 73-1751 (9th Cir. June 5, 1974).
214
United States v. Carderon-Trejo, No. 73-2049 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 1974).
215
United States v. Saldana-Hernandez, No. 73-3395 (9th Cir. June 7, 1974).
216
United States v. Rice, No. 73-2997 (9th Cir. June 7, 1974).
217
United States v. Vbirros, No. 74-2874 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1975).
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and those at a “stop,” and at oral argument, counsel had asked for an
opportunity to distinguish that case, and the parties had also agreed at
oral argument that they had not argued another important point related to
whether defendant’s flight created probable cause; remand was thus in
order.
V. Holding Cases Pending Supreme Court Action. Some panels held
cases until the Supreme Court acted. For example, judges waited until
the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez and then handed down
their decisions. One such panel, quoting Justice Powell’s concurring
opinion, affirmed a conviction because Almeida-Sanchez was not
controlling as the search was at a fixed checkpoint, 218 and a slightly
different panel took identical action two days later. 219 The court of
appeals might also defer action for a case the Supreme Court was only
considering, as one could see when the Ninth Circuit held cases open
pending the Supreme Court’s rulings in Bowen and Ortiz. A Ninth
Circuit judge reported eight cases in which, after acting (affirming or
reversing) on the basis of the court of appeals’ own rulings, the panel had
“withheld the mandate pending action by the Supreme Court in Bowen
and Ortiz.” 220
In a case involving a pre-Almeida-Sanchez San Clemente
checkpoint stop lacking probable cause, a panel observed that, under the
circuit’s own Bowen decision, 221 the district judge had not erred in
denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. However, the panel
nonetheless stayed the mandate until the Supreme Court rulings in
Bowen and Ortiz. 222 The same panel, pointing both to Bowen and to the
panel ruling in Juarez-Rodriguez, also stayed the mandates on finding
that the trial judge had rightly granted a motion to suppress. 223 All such
activity was part of what a law clerk suggested, that one case “should be
held until the court determines the ambit of the Supreme Court’s rule in
Almeida-Sanchez.” 224 And in one of the many cases after AlmeidaSanchez, a panel held a case pending the Supreme Court ruling and the
circuit’s own case as to its retroactivity, United States v. Peltier, 225 and
218

United States v. Hendrix, No. 73-1523 (9th Cir. July 9, 1973).
United States v. Ragusa, No. 73-1314 (9th Cir. July 11, 1973).
220
Memorandum from Ben C. Duniway to Associates (July 21, 1975).
221
United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam).
222
United States v. Holley, No. 74-2997 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 1975).
223
United States v. Lewis, No. 74-2875 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 1975).
224
Memorandum from Don Friedman (law clerk) to Judge Goodwin (Aug. 24, 1973) (re
United States v. Tolbert, No. 73-1941).
225
500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev’d, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
219
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then used those opinions to reverse the conviction, 226 as did panels in a
number of other instances. 227 A panel ordered another deferral while
Martinez-Fuerte 228 was awaiting Supreme Court decision, and then the
panel reversed a district court’s suppression of evidence. 229
VI. Remand for District Court to Hold Case Pending Supreme Court
Action. In addition to holding a case until after a Supreme Court
decision, some panels remanded for district courts to do so in
anticipation of a Supreme Court ruling. Superseding a March 1973
judgment, the court of appeals remanded to allow a defendant to file a
motion to vacate his conviction because the case was likely to be covered
by the Supreme Court decisions in Ortiz, Bowen, and Brignoni-Ponce. 230
Mixing deferral with its remand, the panel suggested further that the
district court would want to postpone action until after the Supreme
Court had acted. 231 Another panel took similar action a few days later,
remanding to the district court to hold the matter open and to rule in the
eventual light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in those cases. 232 When
a Ninth Circuit panel reversed a conviction on the authority of the
circuit’s ruling in Martinez-Fuerte, it also remanded for the district court
to hold the case open pending the Supreme Court rulings in Bowen and
Ortiz as well as the appeal from Martinez-Fuerte itself. 233
VII. Anticipation of Certiorari Grant. Deferral also took place when the
court of appeals believed that the circuit’s decision was likely to be
taken to the Supreme Court and granted review. For example, a
panel, although originally having reversed a conviction for an offense
committed prior to Almeida-Sanchez, ordered the decision withheld
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen and Peltier. 234 Once the
Justices decided in the latter that Almeida-Sanchez should not be

226

United States v. Hornbecker, Nos. 72-2692, 72-2724 (9th Cir. May 17, 1974).
See, e.g., United States v. Zarate-Briceno, No. 73-2114 (9th Cir. July 18, 1974).
228
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
229
United States v. Enriquez, 554 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1977) (table).
230
United States v. Rios-Aguirre, No. 73-1030 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1975). In its earlier
memorandum disposition affirming (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 1973), the court had said one could probably
distinguish the case from Almeida-Sanchez but that the defendant could ask for a rehearing.
231
Rios-Aguirre, No. 73-1030 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1975).
232
United States v. Sanchez-Pedraza, No. 74-2786 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 1975).
233
United States v. Palmanteer, No. 74-2945 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1975).
234
United States v. Gutierrez, No. 73-3134 (9th Cir. July 14, 1975); see also United States v.
Zarate-Briceno, No. 73-2114 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1975); United States v. Slosser, 72-2404 (9th Cir.
Oct. 14, 1975) (vacating the prior disposition and affirming the conviction).
227
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retroactive, the panel granted rehearing and affirmed the conviction. 235
And, having ruled that defendant’s motion to suppress should have been
granted on the basis of the court’s own Bowen ruling 236 and another
case, 237 the judges stayed the mandate pending the filing of a certiorari
petition in Bowen or until sixty days after filing of the memorandum
disposition. Likewise, when the government conceded that those two
cases supported the district court’s grant of a motion to suppress because
the stop at the San Clemente checkpoint came after Almeida-Sanchez and
was invalid because it was without founded suspicion or probable cause,
the court also stayed the mandate pending the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Bowen and the related Ortiz case. 238 After the Ninth Circuit had held
Almeida-Sanchez retroactive in Peltier, a Ninth Circuit panel applied it to
strike down a conviction where the statute and regulation in AlmeidaSanchez “provided the sole underpinning” for the challenged search and
stop. 239 The panel nonetheless stayed the mandate until the Supreme
Court disposed of the pending Peltier certiorari petition. 240
CONCLUSION
In this story of the aftermath of the Almeida-Sanchez case, there was
no simple single arrow from a Supreme Court ruling to a single case
below, but multiple arrows—at first, the Supreme Court ruling plus its
accompanying GVR decisions, plus its later rulings—striking a host of
potentially affected cases, and there were overlapping sets of cases in
play on the status of fixed checkpoints and on the question of AlmeidaSanchez’s retroactivity. The dynamics became yet more complex as the
Ninth Circuit dealt with the first stage of the aftermath of AlmeidaSanchez, particularly by deciding Bowen en banc. Thus there is no single
chronological line to be followed easily, as both the court of appeals and
the Supreme Court were deciding multiple cases in parallel and
intersecting ways.

235

Gutierrez, No. 73-3134 (9th Cir. July 14, 1975).
United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (per curiam).
237
United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974), withdrawn, 568 F.2d 120
(9th Cir. 1976).
238
United States v. Olmstead, No. 74-2759 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1974); see also United States v.
Olmdahl, No. 74-2450 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1974); United States v. Jarvis and Murphy, No. 74-2502
(9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1974); United States v. Atkinson, No. 74-2040 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 1974).
239
United States v. Duran, No. 74-1841 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1974).
240
The Justices subsequently overturned the Ninth Circuit ruling in United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975).
236
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Although not cast in terms of the Supreme Court’s impact, this
Article suggests the great effect that the Supreme Court does have on the
U.S. court of appeals. Despite the possibility that lower federal courts
may thwart the U.S. Supreme Court by avoiding its rulings or at least
their full implications, the evidence here is quite to the contrary, with the
Ninth Circuit having followed the Supreme Court’s lead and having
largely deferred to it. The courts of appeals maintain considerable
autonomy because of the small likelihood that the Justices will accept
any of their cases for review, but they have that autonomy primarily in
areas of law in which the Supreme Court has not spoken. Once the
Justices speak, the lower courts most often follow.
On the basis of the Court’s initial ruling in Almeida-Sanchez, the
court of appeals acted directly: convictions were affirmed, or, more
importantly, reversed. Many others were sent back to the district court
for “reconsideration in light of” the Supreme Court’s action. Other cases
were held for further developments that would facilitate their resolution,
so that multiple panels would not each have to do the same work. And
we see the court of appeals determining which cases would be most
appropriate to decide en banc, to provide the cleanest resolution of the
issues on which other cases depended.
That the court of appeals held cases for decision points to an
especially important, and particularly noteworthy, aspect of Supreme
Court effect: the lower court’s anticipatory deference to the Supreme
Court.
Such deference held constant across competing judicial
ideologies (or “agendas”), as both “liberals” and “conservatives” wanted
key issues, such as whether a ruling on roving patrols applies to fixed
checkpoints or what was a fixed checkpoint or which rulings were
retroactive, resolved by the court of appeals so those matters could go to
the Supreme Court for final resolution, as the judges knew they would.
The dynamic interaction between the two courts resulted in shortterm delay in handing down judgments in particular cases when panels
held cases for decision pending en banc rulings or new Supreme Court
decisions in a string of border search rulings. Yet, despite apparent
delay, there is a sense in which cases moved along more quickly overall.
Not only were a number of cases heard en banc before final panel
action—not the usual situation—but the court acted to send cases more
quickly to the Supreme Court by moving to en banc hearing more
rapidly. Indeed, some judges argued for speeding cases to the Supreme
Court by not tying them up for an extended time in the en banc process,
as they knew that the Justices would have the final word and that these
issues were quite “certworthy.”
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As this story is not only about a lead Supreme Court ruling but also
about several other decisions by the Justices and multiple court of
appeals en banc rulings within roughly a five-year span, one might ask,
almost forty years later, how typical is this story. One answer is, “We
don’t know,” both because materials that would reveal the sorts of
dynamics portrayed here have not been accessible and in large measure
because such dynamics have not been the focus of scholars, who have
looked at the effect of single cases on results in cases below. In many
areas of the law, the Supreme Court decides a case and then does not
accept another case on the subject for quite some time, unlike the
situation portrayed here as to the law of border searches. In areas of the
law in which there are relatively fewer cases, such as antitrust, one can
imagine a major Supreme Court antitrust ruling having effects on U.S.
court of appeals decisions, but there are simply not that many antitrust
cases proceeding in the lower courts at any one time in which immediate
and substantial effects would be registered. Or, after enactment of a
widely challenged statute, a single ruling might cause some lower courts
to have to alter some of their rulings after the Supreme Court overturned
their position on the law, as the Ninth Circuit had to do when new intercircuit conflict developed after Congress passed the Sentencing
Guidelines Act and the Supreme Court upheld it in Mistretta v. United
States. 241
There are, however, areas of law in which a larger number of cases
are at various stages of working their way through the court of appeals,
such that even one Supreme Court ruling will have the range of effects
seen here. Some aspects of substantive criminal law would be among
them, as would, certainly, aspects of criminal procedure, including
effectiveness of counsel, aspects of search and seizure beyond those
covered here, and federal habeas corpus procedure, rulings in all of
which would potentially affect every one of state prisoners’ many efforts
to test their state convictions in federal court. Another such high-volume
area would be immigration law, where the increase in appeals from
agency rulings, most obviously in the Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit, has led to creation of means such as special screening panels to
deal with that volume.
The aftermath or “backwash” from the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Almeida-Sanchez well illustrates the dynamic interaction between the
Supreme Court and a U.S. court of appeals, as well as the latter’s closely
related internal dynamics as it coped with the effects of Almeida-Sanchez
and its progeny. The post-Almeida-Sanchez period also provides a look
241

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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at interaction among court of appeals judges as they decide whether to
hear a case en banc and the reasons why cases are heard en banc. One
also sees substantial use of unpublished dispositions, as the Ninth Circuit
began its regular use of them during this period.
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